The hottest Deterrence Substack posts right now

Technology can change warfare suddenly when a new capability breaks old assumptions, and opponents then adapt; you must study action–reaction dynamics and the different levels of war (tactical, operational, theater) because success at one level can be undone at another.
Deterrence works in the mind of the adversary, so you must threaten what that adversary actually values and fears rather than attacking irrelevant proxies; cultural and political differences shape what will or won’t deter.
Removing war from a region can sap its political and demographic dynamism and leave states less "capax belli," and rising powers that challenge the naval order protecting global commerce risk provoking balancing coalitions and strategic failure.

Deterrence is psychological: you only stop an opponent by shaping what they believe is truly costly, so threats must be targeted at what that enemy actually values and fears.
Political systems shape strategy: autocracies can surprise and force top-down moves but lack self-correction, while democracies keep initiative and genuine commitment; centralized ambitions to seize status (like challenging a dominant navy) risk strategic overreach.
Removing war from Europe removed an engine of national dynamism: banning real combat made armed forces ceremonial, damped social energy and population growth, and weakened states' willingness and capacity to use force when necessary.

The usual claim that the death penalty is uniquely irreversible is weaker than it sounds because many wrongful convictions are never discovered, and in narrow tradeoffs execution could be justified if it genuinely prevented more innocent deaths.
Making executions cheap creates a moral hazard: when decision‑makers bear little cost but impose the ultimate cost on others, they are likelier to make lethally bad decisions, so deliberately inefficient (costly) punishments can protect against abuse.
The historical militia argument for widespread private guns made sense in the eighteenth century but is weaker today; modern checks on governmental power may depend more on control of information, though private arms can still deter crime and limit expansions of police power, leaving the empirical question open.

More nuclear-armed states sharply increase the chance of nuclear war because each new actor creates many more risky bilateral relationships, and new, small arsenals tend toward hair‑trigger postures and weak command‑and‑control.
Keeping launch‑on‑warning postures and letting AI drive early‑warning and decision systems compresses decision time, breeds automation bias, and makes false alarms far more likely to trigger an irreversible nuclear launch.
Democracies and their citizens must demand seriousness: restore credible, durable security guarantees, pursue de‑alerting and arms‑control measures, strengthen command‑and‑control and leader fitness standards, and reward restraint over spectacle.

China will soon have strategic parity with the United States and Russia.
In a tripolar nuclear order, the US may face challenges in strategic balance and deterrence.
To address these challenges, a strategic division of labor in NATO could help maintain a credible deterrent threat.

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Corruption within the Chinese military has led to major purges, affecting Xi Jinping's military actions.
Predicting Xi Jinping's actions regarding Taiwan is difficult due to his secretive nature and complex decision-making process.
Taiwan needs to focus on enhancing its defense capabilities with a balance of investments in munitions, technology, and strategic planning.

The word “war” with Russia is vague and dangerous: without clear, concrete assumptions about what a conflict would actually look like, any military planning is almost meaningless.
Geography, distances and logistics make large-scale conventional campaigning across Europe impractical today, so conflicts would be decided largely by missiles, drones and how well states can police air and sea frontiers.
What’s needed is a realistic NATO political-military doctrine and practical plans for limited scenarios (frontier policing, Baltic/Finland, Black Sea), not symbolic troop gestures that could be destroyed or escalate the situation.

Israel's strategy is based on deterrence, showcasing ability to fight to avoid wars
Deterrence in Israel involves both denial and punishment against adversaries like Hamas and Hezbollah
Deterrence tactics vary between neighbors like Hezbollah and Hamas, with differing levels of effectiveness

Deterrence can be problematic when faced with gradual aggression and doubts about retaliation.
Salami tactics involve slowly achieving goals through small, incremental steps.
Western support for Ukraine increased after Russia's full-scale invasion, challenging Russian red lines and leading to incremental shifts in the conflict.