The hottest Military Strategy Substack posts right now

And their main takeaways
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Top World Politics Topics
Simplicius's Garden of Knowledge • 12389 implied HN points • 27 Oct 24
  1. Zelensky suggested that both Ukraine and Russia should stop attacking each other's energy facilities to avoid a harsh winter. This shows that Ukraine's strikes on Russian infrastructure were more about self-defense than actually crippling Russia.
  2. Putin is preparing to offer different negotiation terms depending on the outcome of the US presidential elections. He is looking to use these negotiations to maintain control over the territories gained in Ukraine.
  3. Ukraine is facing significant troop shortages, which is leading to a decrease in military mobilization. There are discussions about lowering the draft age, highlighting the urgency for Ukraine to bolster its forces.
Breaking the News • 8093 implied HN points • 08 Mar 26
  1. Good strategy means thinking several moves ahead and being ready to change plans faster than your opponent; if leaders don’t ask “How does this end?” they can cause needless disaster.
  2. You shouldn’t choose wars of choice without exhausting alternatives and imagining what could go wrong; many problems have no military solution, so diplomacy and clear, systematic decision rules must come first.
  3. Modern fighting often favors cheap, numerous technologies over a few expensive systems, and a public insulated from combat plus easy political posturing makes it too easy to send others into long, costly wars.
God's Spies by Thomas Neuburger • 1141 implied HN points • 26 Mar 26
  1. Israel may be nearing a breaking point as actual casualties and the everyday strain of sheltering and nonstop attacks are likely far worse than reported, and public and political tolerance for the war has limits.
  2. Israel’s air defenses may be close to collapse after radar damage, leaving it vulnerable to Iranian drones and high-speed missiles that can strike military bases and cities and could force more desperate Israeli options.
  3. A nuclear strike by Israel on Iran could provoke an Iranian retaliatory use of low-yield nukes, causing catastrophic casualties in cities like Tel Aviv and risking uncontrollable regional escalation.
Simplicius's Garden of Knowledge • 12909 implied HN points • 17 Oct 24
  1. Zelensky presented a 'Victory Plan' for Ukraine that hopes to invite NATO membership and ramp up military support. Many people found his ideas unrealistic and lacking substance.
  2. One key point of the plan suggests deploying a strong military deterrent to protect Ukraine from Russia. This has raised concerns about the possible involvement of NATO forces on the ground.
  3. Concerns are growing over the U.S.'s ability to support Ukraine indefinitely, with officials stating they can't provide unlimited resources. This hints at potential limits to Ukraine's military ambitions.
Simplicius's Garden of Knowledge • 12429 implied HN points • 15 Oct 24
  1. Ukraine is facing increasing military pressure from Russia, and the situation for Ukraine seems to be worsening. There are discussions about possibly giving up some territory to reach a peace deal.
  2. Germany is cutting its financial support for Ukraine significantly, leading to concerns about the future of military assistance. This reduction could impact Ukraine's ability to sustain its defense.
  3. Zelensky is expected to address the Ukrainian parliament soon, where he may propose a new plan for victory, but there are hints that this plan might involve compromises regarding territory.
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Glenn’s Substack • 2318 implied HN points • 02 Oct 24
  1. The US faces a serious economic crisis due to high debt levels and declining fiscal responsibility. The country has been unable to effectively address these financial issues since the 2008 crisis.
  2. Efforts to boost US competitiveness, like subsidies and sanctions, often backfire and may harm the economy more. In contrast, countries like China are gaining strength by diversifying their economies and forming new partnerships.
  3. As the US struggles, other countries are building a new economic system that doesn't rely on America. This shift might create a world where multiple powers coexist, rather than one dominant force.
Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 403 implied HN points • 19 Mar 26
  1. The piece argues that President Trump can achieve a lasting victory in Iran.
  2. The president wants an end to the war, but he also believes a premature exit would leave Iran’s core threat intact.
  3. Active U.S. military operations, like Operation Epic Fury in the Eastern Mediterranean, show ongoing engagement and imply a need for sustained pressure.
Glenn Greenwald • 2408 implied HN points • 10 Mar 26
  1. The idea that the U.S. war on Iran is really aimed at hurting China is a new, widely promoted justification that the administration itself has not presented as its main motive.
  2. The China argument is weak because China’s ties to Iran are neither unique nor decisive, and U.S. actions have often pushed Middle Eastern states toward Beijing rather than blocking it.
  3. A more plausible driver of the conflict is pro-Israel and hawkish interests, and the China narrative mainly distracts from Israel’s influence and other political motives behind the war.
Comment is Freed • 132 implied HN points • 21 Mar 26
  1. The war in the Middle East has shifted global attention and resources, pushed oil prices up, and eased sanctions in ways that give Russia a financial windfall and make Western support for Ukraine harder to sustain.
  2. Ukraine has survived a tough winter, is holding its lines, and its long-range strikes and drone-defence expertise are causing real damage to Russian logistics and could become an exportable strength, but Kyiv worries about dwindling Western stocks and political reluctance to help.
  3. Russia’s offensive has been slow and costly, and while Putin still bets on eventual gains, it’s unclear the spring campaign can produce decisive breakthroughs — he may get limited forward movement, but not guaranteed victory.
John’s Substack • 7 implied HN points • 24 Mar 26
  1. The decision not to bomb Iran’s energy infrastructure averted an immediate and dangerous escalation.
  2. Despite avoiding strikes, the situation remains grim because the US still has no viable exit strategy.
  3. Further escalation would be a recipe for disaster since Iran currently holds the stronger hand in this confrontation.
Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 1010 implied HN points • 13 Mar 26
  1. This conflict is more like a Cold War than Afghanistan, meaning it calls for a long-term strategic containment campaign rather than short counterinsurgency operations.
  2. U.S. goals have been inconsistent and shifting, so it's unclear which objectives would end the war or be accepted as 'victory'.
  3. Victory would require massive initial military force followed by sustained total containment, unless the Iranian regime collapses or is overthrown internally.
Glenn’s Substack • 1798 implied HN points • 27 Sep 24
  1. The Nord Stream pipeline attack severed Europe's energy ties with Russia, leading to significant economic changes for both regions.
  2. Initially, the US and NATO blamed Russia for the attack, but later reports suggested that Ukraine might have been involved while evidence pointed to a possible US connection.
  3. As the narrative around the attack evolved, European nations began to turn against each other, showing tensions and doubts about their alliances.
Phillips’s Newsletter • 186 implied HN points • 23 Mar 26
  1. The US lacks a clear, consistent strategic goal and seems to be practicing “mowing the grass.” That means repeated, limited strikes without a path to decisive victory, making the campaign costly and purposeless.
  2. A short cease-fire announcement looks like a tactical backtrack to avoid extreme actions and calm markets, but it probably only pauses operations rather than ends the conflict.
  3. This approach effectively guarantees the Iranian regime survives and can rebuild smarter, so regime change is off the table and strategic gains are doubtful.
QTR’s Fringe Finance • 32 implied HN points • 23 Mar 26
  1. A short, intense bombing campaign caused tactical damage but failed to achieve its strategic goals: Iran’s nuclear program survives and the regime remains intact, with hardliners gaining strength.
  2. Claims that Iran was only weeks from a bomb lacked credible evidence, and U.S. negotiators and intelligence failures meant diplomacy was mishandled while airpower alone cannot destroy dispersed, deeply buried nuclear materials.
  3. The conflict risks dragging the United States into a prolonged, costly war that disrupts global energy markets and may incentivize Iran to keep or pursue nuclear capabilities, so further escalation would be dangerous and costly.
Pieter’s Newsletter • 259 implied HN points • 28 Oct 24
  1. Israel's recent attack on Iran was smart and planned, aiming to weaken Iran's defenses without causing much harm to civilians.
  2. The attack has raised doubts about Iran's leadership and how they protect their citizens, leading to growing discontent among the Iranian people.
  3. The situation highlights a stark contrast between Israel's modern military and Iran's struggling forces, showing a potential for change in the region.
Phillips’s Newsletter • 240 implied HN points • 20 Mar 26
  1. The US lacks the capability, skills, and strategic mindset to effectively oppose China in the Western Pacific and would struggle to defend Taiwan or Japan for any sustained period.
  2. Much of America's decline is self-inflicted: poor strategic choices, weakened institutions, and degraded military thinking have eroded its ability to wage effective campaigns.
  3. Changes in military technology and China's much greater capacity to generate and sustain forces give China a long-term advantage, so even if the US wins early battles, China is likelier to prevail over time.
Richard Hanania's Newsletter • 1926 implied HN points • 07 Mar 26
  1. Targeted killing of hostile leaders is an effective, achievable foreign-policy tool that can reduce threats without full-scale nation building.
  2. The United States should favor limited, precise actions like leader-decapitation over large, costly interventions and long occupations.
  3. This approach still carries real risks of escalation and unintended consequences, so it must be used carefully and isn’t a cure-all.
Glenn’s Substack • 1039 implied HN points • 24 Sep 24
  1. The conflict in Gaza is spreading and could bring in more countries, which worries local leaders facing protests for not being tougher against Israel and the US.
  2. Ukraine is struggling with a lack of resources, and the situation is getting worse as public support is fading and political divisions grow.
  3. Both the Middle East and Ukraine are heading towards major wars, and the US seems to lack a clear plan to deal with these rising tensions.
Phillips’s Newsletter • 346 implied HN points • 18 Mar 26
  1. The US and Israel are running a high-tech air campaign that can strike many targets and kill leaders, but that military edge has not yet forced political collapse or produced internal allies to end the war.
  2. Iran is fighting a very different, low-cost campaign that uses its coastline, drones, and sea drones to threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and disrupt the global economy in order to pressure opponents politically.
  3. Both sides are racing against time: US political pressure (especially on the president) raises the risk of escalation, while Iran hopes to outlast strikes, so the conflict could intensify before it eases.
The Chris Hedges Report • 345 implied HN points • 12 Mar 26
  1. The U.S. and Israel miscalculated by launching the attack on Iran; there is no clear military exit and the campaign risks a humiliating defeat that could weaken American influence in the region.
  2. Iran is using a smart asymmetric strategy—missiles, drones, and threats to close the Strait of Hormuz while targeting energy and desalination infrastructure—to inflict economic pain and gain bargaining leverage.
  3. The conflict could trigger a major global economic shock, push Gulf states to rethink their ties with the U.S., and draw more Russian and Chinese support for Iran, multiplying long-term geopolitical risks for Israel and America.
Glenn’s Substack • 1978 implied HN points • 14 Sep 24
  1. Putin believes that long-range missiles provided by NATO will turn the conflict into a direct war between NATO and Russia. He warns this could escalate to nuclear war.
  2. The situation reflects a shift from a proxy war, where NATO supported Ukraine against Russia indirectly, to a direct confrontation. Incremental steps by NATO have blurred the lines between these two types of conflict.
  3. There is a concern that Russia will respond aggressively if NATO attacks. This could lead to serious escalation, putting the world at risk of a nuclear exchange.
Comment is Freed • 241 implied HN points • 15 Mar 26
  1. The war is split between air dominance by Israel and the US and a separate, more consequential campaign of Iranian missiles and drones that is disrupting regional economies and blocking shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
  2. Iran planned for survival and has used regional attacks as counter-coercion, while the US and Israel lacked a clear strategy and wrongly assumed a short, decisive victory that left them unprepared for the wider economic fallout.
  3. The Iranian regime is fragile but can still leverage the chaos it creates to extract concessions, and the mounting international economic pain is increasing pressure on the US to find a negotiated way out.
Rough Diamonds • 25 implied HN points • 13 Mar 26
  1. Explosives and propellants are the single biggest supply bottleneck in a US–China Pacific war; precision missiles and torpedoes could be used up in weeks to months.
  2. The US energetics supply chain is tiny and fragile—many critical ingredients and products come from one or a few plants, and expanding or qualifying new facilities is expensive, dangerous, and takes years.
  3. New manufacturing tech and startups could raise capacity and safety (continuous flow, AI control), but they won’t solve a near‑term crisis, so policymakers must consider faster procurement, allied sourcing, substitutions, or cannibalizing stocks.
Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 426 implied HN points • 09 Mar 26
  1. Almost 900 pounds of 60% enriched uranium are sealed in a lead-lined cache under a mountain near Isfahan, making it an extremely valuable and highly radioactive asset.
  2. The U.S. and Israel entombed the material during the June war so it appears largely inaccessible without a major excavation, but intelligence says a very narrow access point might still allow retrieval.
  3. Whoever manages to reach and secure this uranium—Iran, the U.S., or Israel—would gain major strategic and nuclear leverage, turning control of it into a high-stakes international race.
Doomberg • 8012 implied HN points • 02 Jan 26
  1. Saskatchewan sits on an enormous, flat, and predictable potash-rich evaporite formation that formed when an ancient sea repeatedly evaporated, which makes large-scale mining relatively easy and cheap.
  2. The province is the world’s dominant potash producer with vast reserves and supplies roughly a third of global potash needs, making it a major source for fertilizer and a key supplier to the U.S.
  3. Rising geopolitical assertiveness in the Western Hemisphere raises the risk that a sparsely populated, resource-rich place like Saskatchewan could become a strategic target or subject to pressure.
Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 370 implied HN points • 09 Mar 26
  1. Kharg Island is the centerpiece of Iran's energy industry and handles roughly 80–90% of the country's crude oil exports.
  2. Sitting in the northern Persian Gulf just 16 miles off Iran's coast, the island is a strategic chokepoint that has been contested for centuries.
  3. Because of its outsized role in Iran's oil exports, U.S. and Israeli planners are debating whether to incapacitate or seize the island, so its fate could be decisive in a conflict with Iran.
bad cattitude • 252 implied HN points • 04 Mar 26
  1. Iran’s ruling theocracy is deeply repressive and enforces severe human rights abuses, while also investing heavily in missiles, drones, and nuclear-capable programs that pose a real regional threat.
  2. The international order is shifting back toward hard-power great power competition as institutions like the UN lose influence, and actors such as China and Russia are bolstering rivals and shaping outcomes with military and technological support.
  3. There are no easy answers: using force to decapitate the regime can remove threats but risks chaos and backlash, while inaction risks ceding influence and strategic advantage to rivals—both options involve serious trade‑offs.
Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 273 implied HN points • 09 Mar 26
  1. Demanding unconditional surrender is unrealistic and risks prolonging the war instead of producing a clear, achievable outcome.
  2. Iran’s forces, especially the IRGC, are decentralized and prepared to continue fighting, so they are unlikely to capitulate quickly.
  3. A smarter strategy would set limited, achievable goals—like degrading Iran’s missile and drone strike capabilities—so a leader could claim victory and disengage.
Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 672 implied HN points • 28 Feb 26
  1. The United States and Israel, led by Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, shifted from coercion to a decapitation strategy and launched strikes aimed at Iran’s supreme leader.
  2. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s fate is unclear—officials say he may be dead or hiding—so he is now being treated as a target rather than a negotiating partner.
  3. Planners on the attacking side had long prepared 'day after' contingencies for how to manage the situation if the supreme leader were removed.
Brad DeLong's Grasping Reality • 407 implied HN points • 01 Mar 26
  1. A US–Israeli decapitation strike that killed Iran’s supreme leader removed a key figure but probably won’t guarantee the regime’s collapse. Iran’s overlapping institutions mean it could become a harder-line military junta, descend into a messy power struggle, or wage prolonged resistance.
  2. The attack undercuts arms-control credibility and signals that diplomacy may not protect states, so regional powers are likely to race to build, harden, and disperse nuclear or other deterrent capabilities. That incentive structure makes proliferation and future crises more likely.
  3. This war has no clear endgame, strains US military resources needed to deter rivals elsewhere, and risks serious economic disruption by threatening oil routes like the Strait of Hormuz. It also normalizes leader-targeting and preventive decapitation tactics, increasing the chance of catastrophic escalation.
Phillips’s Newsletter • 297 implied HN points • 11 Mar 26
  1. The US and Israel are pursuing different objectives: the US is focused on degrading Iran's military command-and-control, air defenses, and naval capabilities, while Israel is also striking energy and fuel infrastructure to more deeply weaken Iran's resilience.
  2. American public support for the war is low and sharply partisan, with Republicans mostly backing the president, Democrats largely opposed, and independents generally unconvinced.
  3. How long the war lasts will be driven by US political pressures and oil market effects; rising oil prices and the 2026 midterms create strong incentives for a quick end, and Washington can largely determine the campaign's duration.
Doomberg • 7638 implied HN points • 06 Dec 25
  1. China has built a vast underground tunnel system for its military, which raises concerns about its nuclear capabilities. Many experts believe this could mean China has more nuclear warheads than previously reported.
  2. Recent tensions between China and Japan, especially regarding Taiwan, have caused severe diplomatic and economic rifts. China has reacted strongly to Japan's new military stances and comments about Taiwan.
  3. China's actions in the energy and commodity markets suggest it may be preparing for potential conflict. This could indicate that they are gearing up for military action to regain control over Taiwan.
ChinaTalk • 311 implied HN points • 26 Feb 26
  1. Strategic choices are always made with incomplete information and human biases, so leaders often miss warning signs by assuming others will act like they would.
  2. Domestic politics and a leader's need to avoid humiliation or preserve popularity strongly shape whether states respond or escalate, as seen when political pressure forced a decisive military reaction.
  3. Nuclear weapons became almost unthinkable to use because no one could credibly ‘win’ such a war, and arms control mostly formalized that; by contrast, AI poses different, layered risks that won’t map neatly onto Cold War-style treaties.
The Dossier • 248 implied HN points • 01 Mar 26
  1. The U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran not only target its nuclear program but also undercut China’s cheap oil supply from Iran, removing a key energy hedge Beijing relied on if sea lanes to Taiwan were contested.
  2. Breaking Iran’s regime and its proxy network would make the Middle East easier for the U.S. and Israel to manage, freeing ships, aircraft, munitions, and attention for the Indo‑Pacific.
  3. The operation demonstrates American willingness to use decisive force and could push Gulf producers to align more with Washington during a Taiwan crisis, narrowing Beijing’s strategic options.
Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 255 implied HN points • 04 Mar 26
  1. He set clear rules for using U.S. military power — no ground troops, no nation‑building, and quick “one‑and‑done” strikes.
  2. In the current Iran confrontation he’s breaking those rules, moving away from brief strikes toward a potentially multi‑week campaign.
  3. His approach to war is changeable: in recent days he has broken some rules, kept others, and abandoned a long American taboo, showing his tactics shift with circumstances.
Phillips’s Newsletter • 388 implied HN points • 02 Mar 26
  1. The bombing campaign looks driven by one leader's personal and political needs rather than a clear national interest, showing how much leadership choices can override state rationality.
  2. There is no stable strategic 'end' guiding the action, so the claimed 'ways' and 'means' keep changing as leaders flail for a victory they can sell, making traditional Ends‑Ways‑Means analysis misleading here.
  3. Treating the military and Iranian people as tools is dangerous—public support is low and the unpredictability of these decisions raises the risk of costly, unintended consequences.
Phillips’s Newsletter • 208 implied HN points • 09 Mar 26
  1. The US and Israeli air campaign has severely degraded Iranian air defenses, missile and drone capabilities, and targeted Iranian leaders, but it’s not clear what political or military end state those strikes are meant to achieve.
  2. Public messaging from US leadership is contradictory—claims of victory and surrender are mixed with admissions the war is ongoing—so it’s hard to tell whether the chaos is genuine or deliberate misdirection.
  3. This mix of coercive strikes and noisy signaling mirrors what was done in Venezuela and will be a litmus test in Iran for whether this emerging US doctrine actually achieves its strategic aims.
Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 542 implied HN points • 19 Feb 26
  1. Trump campaigned against endless Middle East wars but has shifted toward a more interventionist posture as talks with Iran falter.
  2. Recent strikes like Operation Midnight Hammer and Israel's campaign severely degraded Iran's nuclear, air-defense, and missile capabilities and have brought U.S. forces closer to confrontation.
  3. The episode shows a recurring pattern in American power: leaders who promise change often revert to established interventionist strategies when faced with security threats.
Fisted by Foucault • 174 implied HN points • 05 Mar 26
  1. Iran is unusually vulnerable right now—internal protests, recent strikes, and waning support from Russia and China make it a tempting moment to try to decisively weaken or topple the regime.
  2. Removing or altering Iran’s government would eliminate the region’s main state challenger to U.S. influence and could significantly blunt Iran-backed groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis.
  3. U.S. strategy in the Middle East has long focused on securing oil supplies, using energy as geopolitical leverage, and protecting Israel, and ousting Iran would be seen as completing that long-running project.
ChinaTalk • 800 implied HN points • 03 Feb 26
  1. Technology can change warfare suddenly when a new capability breaks old assumptions, and opponents then adapt; you must study action–reaction dynamics and the different levels of war (tactical, operational, theater) because success at one level can be undone at another.
  2. Deterrence works in the mind of the adversary, so you must threaten what that adversary actually values and fears rather than attacking irrelevant proxies; cultural and political differences shape what will or won’t deter.
  3. Removing war from a region can sap its political and demographic dynamism and leave states less "capax belli," and rising powers that challenge the naval order protecting global commerce risk provoking balancing coalitions and strategic failure.