The hottest Alliances Substack posts right now

And their main takeaways
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Top World Politics Topics
Noahpinion • 29824 implied HN points • 10 Mar 26
  1. Coalitions are hardening: in the Western and Middle Eastern theaters the U.S., Europe, Ukraine, and Israel are aligning against Russia and Iran, while alliances in Asia remain murky with India mostly neutral and China cautious.
  2. Drones and AI are already reshaping warfare: strike drones and AI-driven targeting and decision‑support systems are being battle‑tested and will be central to how future wars are fought.
  3. World War 3 isn’t imminent but the risk is rising: hardened alliances, disruptive military tech, and uncertain balances of power create foothills that could let a regional war escalate into a much larger conflict.
Noahpinion • 22706 implied HN points • 04 Mar 26
  1. Japan can rapidly serve as a production base for U.S. defense needs because it has deep industrial capabilities, experienced engineers, strong IP protection, and faster regulatory paths.
  2. Japan is rapidly scaling defense capacity by increasing spending, using industrial policy and subsidies, and courting foreign investment and co-manufacturing partnerships.
  3. U.S. defense and deep-tech companies should move quickly to partner with Japan, since it already supplies critical materials and manufacturing and early partners gain strategic advantages.
Noahpinion • 27412 implied HN points • 01 Mar 26
  1. The end of Pax Americana removed many rules that used to restrain U.S. power, so a more multipolar world now lets leaders act more unilaterally and aggressively — something advocates of multipolarity may regret.
  2. Trump’s recent strikes, including the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, are a major escalation and show the president can launch a war of choice without Congress; that’s dangerous for American democracy even if Iran’s regime was brutal.
  3. This conflict has materially weakened the China–Russia–Iran axis but hasn’t ended the multipolar era, and Western leftists’ strong public support for Iran shows a troubling loss of coherent moral or strategic judgment.
Thinking about... • 724 implied HN points • 06 Mar 26
  1. A small network of wealthy private actors and close advisers — an "oligarchical corridor" — is shaping major foreign policy choices by bypassing official institutions and public debate.
  2. The war with Iran appears to benefit foreign states and wealthy interests (notably Israel, Saudi Arabia, and in some respects Russia) while harming US strategic interests by wasting weapons, weakening allies, and showing tactical unpreparedness.
  3. This dynamic erodes American institutions and citizen influence, leaving force and policy to private deals and personal loyalties, and recognizing that trend is the first step toward restoring democratic accountability.
Wrong Side of History • 403 implied HN points • 06 Mar 26
  1. The UK–US 'special relationship' is real in institutions and history but is unequal and often treated with cynicism because each country ultimately puts its own interests first.
  2. British domestic politics and shifting voter demographics make leaders cautious about joining American military actions, so popular opposition and unclear goals limit UK support.
  3. The alliance was strongest when both sides shared a clear mission against common threats and deep ties (culture, nuclear forces, intelligence), but its emotional pull has weakened across generations.
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Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 324 implied HN points • 12 Mar 26
  1. Iran is growing regionally isolated and its proxy forces like Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas are weakened or sidelined.
  2. That isolation gives the United States and Gulf Arab states a rare strategic opening to deepen security cooperation and counter shared threats.
  3. The Abraham Accords can be upgraded from symbolic normalization into a practical, integrated security architecture linking Israel and the Gulf.
Phillips’s Newsletter • 271 implied HN points • 16 Mar 26
  1. Trump is speeding the U.S.’s decline by deliberately weakening core pillars like social cohesion, political institutions, and the military’s ability to think.
  2. Alliances are a central source of American global power and are essential for winning wars, so damaging the U.S.-led alliance system severely weakens the country’s position.
  3. The administration only just seemed to realize alliances matter, but after actively trying to undermine them the damage may already be hard to undo.
TK News by Matt Taibbi • 6802 implied HN points • 14 Jan 26
  1. Donald Trump's moves around Greenland are being seen as a direct threat to NATO and could hasten the alliance's collapse.
  2. Since the Soviet Union fell, NATO has repeatedly expanded its mission and pushed risky policies to justify its continued existence, often at high cost.
  3. Some argue that NATO outlived its original purpose and that its demise might not be tragic, given how it became self-justifying and aggressive.
Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 519 implied HN points • 06 Mar 26
  1. A joint U.S.-Israel attack killed Iran’s top leadership and many senior commanders, marking an unprecedented escalation in the conflict.
  2. Iran retaliated with missile and drone strikes across the region targeting Israel, U.S. bases, and other countries, which has already caused U.S. military deaths and widened the war.
  3. U.S. public support is low and many worry this could be a long, unpredictable war; experts warn it might spark internal collapse in Iran and will reshape power dynamics across the Middle East and beyond.
Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 556 implied HN points • 04 Mar 26
  1. Operation Epic Fury is creating a new way for regional powers to coordinate responses to Iranian attacks.
  2. During the First Gulf War, the United States spent months building a broad international coalition and prioritized Arab participation while keeping Israel out of direct action.
  3. Israel once chose restraint—refraining from retaliation even when targeted—to avoid breaking a fragile coalition, showing how political considerations can shape military responses.
Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 412 implied HN points • 03 Mar 26
  1. Canada publicly aligned with the United States and Israel after the recent attacks on Iran, backing steps to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and affirming Israel’s right to self-defense.
  2. That stance effectively pauses Canada’s recent pivot toward China and sets aside prior tensions with the U.S., including disputes over tariffs and trade.
  3. After long waits, there are signs Canadians are finally getting access to family doctors, ending years on waiting lists for some patients.
Brad DeLong's Grasping Reality • 130 implied HN points • 03 Mar 26
  1. The U.S. joined Israel’s strikes on Iran with maximalist goals but no coherent strategy, and senior officials appear to be improvising rather than managing a planned campaign.
  2. Political optics and alliance pressure — wanting to look strong and not be outflanked by Netanyahu — helped drive the decision more than careful strategic planning.
  3. The strikes have hit military and civilian sites and caused casualties, but Iran’s coercive apparatus remains largely intact, so hopes for quick regime change are unrealistic.
Anima Mundi • 267 implied HN points • 22 Feb 26
  1. The old postwar security architecture is fraying: the New START treaty lapsed and American guarantees to Europe are being redefined, pushing Europe to rearm and raising nuclear and military risks.
  2. Several crises are converging — a possible US strike on Iran, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and China’s strategic positioning — which together increase global instability and encourage arms races and opportunistic aggression.
  3. Trust in institutions and assumptions is weakening — courts, executive rules, trade policy, and techno-optimism around AI are being treated as malleable, ending a ā€˜deferred’ way of managing security and the future and forcing hard choices about who pays and what gets sacrificed.
Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 913 implied HN points • 19 Jan 26
  1. His muscular, unilateral foreign policy has produced big wins, like strikes on Iran’s nuclear program, pressure that helped free hostages, and the raid that captured Venezuela’s leader.
  2. His push to acquire Greenland and petulant diplomacy have created a diplomatic crisis with allies, risking immediate political fallout.
  3. Alienating allies could turn those victories into strategic liabilities, because long-term security often depends on sustained cooperation with partners.
Thinking about... • 828 implied HN points • 11 Jan 26
  1. A possessive, aggressive approach to friends destroys trust and ends helpful cooperation.
  2. Existing alliances and agreements already give access and security when needed; asking and cooperating works far better than trying to seize things.
  3. Trying to claim or bully allied territory can break alliances, weaken national security, and hand advantage to rival powers.
The Chris Hedges Report • 134 implied HN points • 24 Feb 26
  1. U.S. foreign policy that prioritizes short-term extraction and personal gain over alliances and norms pushes other countries to "de-risk" and build alternatives, which will shrink American influence, wealth, and security over time.
  2. A leadership style that demands flattery, sidelines experienced diplomats, and weaponizes economic tools erodes soft power and international trust, making the U.S. an unreliable partner.
  3. The likely result is a more fragmented, competitive, and unstable world order — with Europe and others acting more independently, weaker global cooperation on climate and health, and greater space for authoritarian powers to grow.
Phillips’s Newsletter • 164 implied HN points • 24 Feb 26
  1. Buying lots of foreign weapons can make a country look strong but leaves it dependent, fragile, and sometimes weaker when war actually comes.
  2. Countries should invest in their own capacity to build, adapt, and sustain weapons—industry, logistics, and mobilization matter more than just owning hardware.
  3. History shows that even militarily advanced forces with foreign-made kit can face near-disaster if they lack domestic production, maintenance, and rapid mobilization systems.
Gideon's Substack • 38 implied HN points • 10 Mar 26
  1. Every US administration has promised to pull back from the Middle East but has ended up deepening America’s involvement through interventions, support for allies, and periodic bombing.
  2. The core reason isn’t just lobbies or oil or contractors but the US’s hegemonic position and the public’s desire to disengage without accepting the risks and costs of truly leaving, which makes withdrawal politically and strategically hard.
  3. Empires don’t just walk away, so the pattern of managing regional conflicts with diplomacy plus occasional force is likely to keep repeating until a major collapse or catastrophe forces a permanent change, and the current war could help trigger that instability.
ChinaTalk • 326 implied HN points • 27 Jan 26
  1. The apparent calm in US-China relations is a deliberate lull: China has prepared responses and is using measured escalations like rare-earth export controls to gain leverage, especially timed around the US midterms.
  2. US policy is inconsistent and personality-driven: frequent personnel churn and a president who acts as his own China desk produce seesaws between confrontation and mollification, leaving allies undercut and pushing a sector-by-sector "whack-a-mole" approach instead of a coherent strategy.
  3. The real stakes are long-term and allied: flashy moves in places like Venezuela or Iran won't change Beijing's calculus, so the US needs to double down on alliances (especially Japan) and strategy, because continued risky gambles that have worked so far could eventually backfire.
Brad DeLong's Grasping Reality • 261 implied HN points • 30 Jan 26
  1. Russia punches above its economic weight militarily and has nuclear weapons, so Europe can no longer assume outside guarantees will always hold. Europe must prepare credible independent defense options.
  2. Two mini-lateral coalitions — an "Inner Europe" core (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Netherlands) and a "Viking Alliance" of northern states plus the UK, Baltics, and Ukraine — could form the main conventional balance to Russia. If they build real command structures, budgets, and production, they would outweigh Russia in conventional resources.
  3. Emergent European military coalitions would change deterrence and U.S. politics by making any presidential tilt toward Russia more visible and politically costly. They would normalize forward deployments, bilateral guarantees, and industrial cooperation that strengthen collective defense.
The Chris Hedges Report • 174 implied HN points • 05 Feb 26
  1. A U.S. leader who favors unilateral use of military and economic power and dismisses international institutions and allies can dismantle the post‑war rules‑based order and leave the country isolated.
  2. The world has shifted from unipolarity to multipolarity with China as a formidable great power, making East Asia the primary strategic flashpoint and increasing the risk of dangerous crises despite deep economic ties.
  3. Eroding the rule of law at home and gutting soft‑power tools while doubling down on fossil‑fuel economics will weaken U.S. influence, harm long‑term competitiveness, and raise the chances of domestic authoritarianism or reckless foreign adventures.
Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 602 implied HN points • 23 Dec 25
  1. American security relies on Israeli experience, technology, and close collaboration because those contributions make the United States safer.
  2. There is a sharp divide in conservative circles, with some saying Israel is an ally and others calling it a liability that drags the U.S. into wars.
  3. Critics ask what the U.S. gets from the relationship, but the practical defense benefits of partnering with Israel are presented as clear reasons to maintain it.
Phillips’s Newsletter • 119 implied HN points • 17 Feb 26
  1. The biggest mistake in US foreign policy is treating American military power as proof of overall competence or wisdom.
  2. Decades of US military dominance led allies, especially in Europe, to defer intellectually and stop thinking for themselves.
  3. Military strength gave the US undeserved credibility in non-military areas, producing bad judgments and a gap between perceived and actual competence.
eugyppius: a plague chronicle • 145 implied HN points • 09 Feb 26
  1. Trump's push for Greenland is rooted in real strategic concerns about the Arctic and in his doubts about NATO; when he questions the alliance he leans toward seeking more direct U.S. control over key territory.
  2. Denmark and other European states are effectively unable to sell Greenland because of constitutional limits and post‑colonial political commitments, so the idea of an easy transfer of sovereignty is unrealistic.
  3. The U.S. presence in Europe functions like an informal empire that gives Washington influence and economic benefits, and Trump's strategy mixes pressure on NATO with efforts to cultivate friendly populist parties to sideline the EU — a move that risks political blowback in Europe.
Common Sense with Bari Weiss • 250 implied HN points • 21 Jan 26
  1. People are openly questioning whether the United States still leads the global order, which suggests American dominance may be weakening.
  2. Public disputes among Western allies reveal real fractures in their relationships, not just routine policy differences.
  3. This feels like a rupture rather than a smooth power shift, leaving the future of Western unity and the rules-based world order uncertain.
imetatronink • 4029 implied HN points • 01 Dec 23
  1. Major geopolitical players are openly defying the 'rules-based international order'.
  2. Russia has emerged as a formidable military force through economical destruction of NATO-armed armies.
  3. New alliances are forming, pushing back imperial rule and repudiating the empire's debt notes.
Noahpinion • 19294 implied HN points • 30 Jan 24
  1. Understanding the importance of a rules-based international order for personal well-being and global prosperity.
  2. Governing requires engaging with diverse ideas, considering evidence, and compromising for effective legislation.
  3. Emphasizing the significance of win-win strategies over winner-take-all approaches in addressing complex issues.
imetatronink • 4107 implied HN points • 27 Oct 23
  1. The United States is amassing a large naval force in the eastern Mediterranean, Red, and Arabian seas, along with NATO nations and submarines.
  2. A significant military buildup indicates a potential impending conflict, likely targeting Iran and its allies.
  3. There is a high risk of conflict escalation, particularly considering the involvement of Russia and the strategic bases in Syria.
imetatronink • 4402 implied HN points • 29 Jul 23
  1. The US may struggle to establish air superiority against Russia due to Russian air defenses.
  2. American air power may not be able to sustain prolonged warfare against peer adversaries like Russia, China, or Iran.
  3. There is increasing military coordination between Russia, China, and Iran, hinting at joint defense against possible attacks.
Comment is Freed • 103 implied HN points • 01 Feb 26
  1. Intelligence cooperation among the Five Eyes stayed strong despite political turbulence in the U.S., and leaders worked to preserve that relationship.
  2. U.S. intelligence chiefs are often political appointees and can be used in different ways; a former diplomat like Bill Burns was deployed to send diplomatic signals such as visiting Moscow.
  3. MI6 leaders can carry out quiet, sensitive conversations that higher-profile officials might not be able to, and they avoid asking partners to do things that would conflict with those partners' legal or compliance rules.
Letters from an American • 28 implied HN points • 25 Feb 26
  1. Ukraine resisted and adapted instead of collapsing, mobilizing civilians and growing its military while innovating with drones and other technologies to keep fighting.
  2. U.S. policy shifted from strong support and coordinated sanctions under Biden to a more Russia-friendly stance under Trump, which disrupted funding, diplomacy, and aid and helped shift momentum on the battlefield.
  3. The war has reshaped global politics and economies: sanctions and allied support initially weakened Russia, Europe is moving toward greater self-reliance, but the conflict remains unresolved and has caused heavy civilian suffering.
Geopolitical Economy Report • 1455 implied HN points • 10 Feb 24
  1. Putin criticized Tucker Carlson's anti-China rhetoric and CIA ties, highlighting China's peaceful cooperation philosophy.
  2. Geopolitical strategies that try to separate Russia and China have been endorsed by both Republicans and far-right leaders in Europe.
  3. Tucker Carlson's past as a neoconservative and CIA applicant contrasts with his present-day populist image and anti-China stance.
Noahpinion • 10529 implied HN points • 12 Feb 24
  1. 2024 could be a pivotal year for Cold War 2, with China's weakening economy and potential U.S. instability altering the global balance of power.
  2. China's economic strength is the core of New Axis power, posing a significant threat to the liberal world order by potentially overwhelming the U.S. in a war.
  3. The economic rise of China is a key factor driving Cold War 2, with its manufacturing might elevating the threat posed by the New Axis.
Pekingnology • 56 implied HN points • 13 Feb 26
  1. The current U.S. approach puts tariffs at the center while deliberately avoiding the sharpest political flashpoints and publicly offering cooperation.
  2. That mix has created a rare opening for steadier ties — suspended tariff actions, resumed talks, planned leader visits, and possible cooperation on practical issues like AI risks, ceasefires, and trade.
  3. The stability is fragile because Congress, U.S. bureaucrats, allies, and Taiwan-related incidents could quickly reignite tensions, so crisis-management channels, downplaying ideology, and focused cooperation are urgently needed.
Matt Ehret's Insights • 2633 implied HN points • 06 May 23
  1. The British Empire agenda towards a world government revivalism is being pursued through figures like King Charles III and Pope Francis, shaping a tribalist global governance system.
  2. Historical figures like Cecil Rhodes aspired to restore British imperial power through unipolar world government controlled by a new priest class.
  3. Nationalist efforts to promote cooperation among sovereign nation states for mutual development were challenged by imperial forces seeking a British-led New World Order.
Phillips’s Newsletter • 231 implied HN points • 19 Dec 25
  1. China’s rising influence owes as much to bad leadership choices by the U.S. and Russia as to Chinese long-term planning, so its strength looks bigger than it may really be.
  2. U.S. unpredictability on trade and security — like punitive tariffs, exemptions for China, and a policy shift away from defending allies — has eroded trust among Indo-Pacific partners and handed advantages to China.
  3. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made Moscow economically and militarily dependent on China, turning Russia into a strategic client and increasing Beijing’s leverage.
Brad DeLong's Grasping Reality • 146 implied HN points • 19 Dec 25
  1. Global supply chains are tightly agglomerated: big clusters and specialized intermediates lock in advantages so that countries can look self‑sufficient overall while still being vulnerable to single choke points, and China sits at the hub of many of those inputs.
  2. Unpredictable, weaponized tariffs erode trust and allied coordination, pushing partners toward precautionary stockpiles or alternative suppliers instead of collective solutions, which deepens fragmentation and weakens coalitions.
  3. Agglomeration economics and China’s dominant supplier role mean the outcome of the race to be the world’s manufacturing ā€œfurnaceā€ is likely set by where clusters already exist, not by slogans about decoupling, and self‑inflicted frictions like Brexit make regions less resilient.
Spoils of War • 786 implied HN points • 30 Jan 24
  1. There is a push for action against Iran despite lack of evidence.
  2. Admiral Stavridis' rise in the military and political circles is characterized by toadying and political maneuvering.
  3. His involvement in conflicts like the Libya intervention and advocacy for aggressive actions in Russia and Syria raises concerns.