The hottest Mortgages Substack posts right now

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CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 220 implied HN points • 20 Mar 26
  1. Mortgage equity withdrawal was only slightly positive in Q4. Mortgage debt rose about $99 billion, indicating homeowners only modestly tapped home equity.
  2. Mortgage debt as a share of GDP is about 43.8%, well below the housing‑bubble peak, so most homeowners still have large equity cushions (homeowner equity around 71%).
  3. Much of the increase in mortgage debt likely reflects home purchases and routine changes like principal payments or debt write‑offs, so true cash‑out borrowing is limited and the 'home ATM' remains mostly closed.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 205 implied HN points • 16 Mar 26
  1. Home sales are very low and months-of-supply is above pre-pandemic levels, which is putting downward pressure on prices, though not triggering a crash because most homeowners hold substantial equity and many have low mortgage rates.
  2. Mortgage rates first fell briefly but have moved up to seven-month highs, and geopolitical uncertainty plus stock market weakness are hurting buyer demand and could further weaken sales.
  3. Price indexes show only modest year-over-year gains (around 1–2%) with small month-to-month rises, but the trend is slowing and the Case-Shiller data has a lag that may understate current price pressure.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 215 implied HN points • 13 Mar 26
  1. Existing-home inventory has risen and months-of-inventory are mostly above pre‑pandemic levels, putting downward pressure on prices and making a year‑over‑year price decline possible this year, though a large wave of distressed sales is unlikely because most owners have strong equity and low mortgage rates.
  2. The housing market is uneven across regions: some areas are seeing bigger inventory increases and price drops, while places like the Northeast have smaller inventory gains and continuing price increases.
  3. Homebuilders look to have a rough 2026 with many completed and under‑construction homes unsold, leading to price cuts to compete with existing‑home inventory; overall active listings are up year‑over‑year but remain below typical 2017–2019 levels and the pace of growth is slowing.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 229 implied HN points • 11 Mar 26
  1. Many upbeat predictions about the existing home market have turned out to be wrong.
  2. The existing home market has stayed in a deep recession, with sales remaining weak.
  3. Lower mortgage rates do help with affordability. But that only explains part of the weak sales — other factors are keeping the market down.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 272 implied HN points • 09 Mar 26
  1. Mortgage lending climbed to a 3.5‑year high in Q4, driven by a surge in refinances as lower rates improved affordability and expanded the pool of refinance‑eligible borrowers.
  2. Average annual property insurance payments reached an all‑time high in 2025, rising 6.6%, and borrowers with higher insurance burdens are more likely to fall behind on payments.
  3. Overall delinquencies dipped slightly, but serious delinquencies and active foreclosures rose, leaving over 850,000 borrowers 90+ days past due or in foreclosure—the highest level since mid‑2018.
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CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 258 implied HN points • 09 Mar 26
  1. February existing-home sales look to be down slightly year-over-year based on early market data.
  2. Active inventory is higher than a year ago—Altos shows about a 6.9% rise for single-family homes and reporting markets show roughly a 10% increase—but levels are still low within the year and a seasonal pickup is expected.
  3. New listings have ticked up modestly (around 1.8% YoY) while closed sales in early-reporting markets fell about 1.1% YoY, and sales remain well below February 2019 levels.
Erdmann Housing Tracker • 105 implied HN points • 16 Mar 26
  1. The 2008 mortgage crackdown was a huge, lasting drop in buyer demand that reshaped housing markets, and leaving it out of explanations leads to misleading conclusions about rising prices.
  2. Most post-2009 price gains happened in the cheapest neighborhoods because investors bought up homes left unattainable to denied buyers, so investor activity often signals the mortgage access collapse rather than acting as an independent cause.
  3. Homebuilding capacity fell after 2008 and completions remain well below pre-crisis levels, meaning supply shifted left and affordability worsened; treating the crash as an inevitable, unquestioned correction blocks better policy thinking.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 263 implied HN points • 05 Mar 26
  1. Mortgage-backed security yields fell when 10-year Treasuries briefly dropped below 4%, but MBS spreads to Treasuries widened and are now about as wide or wider than before the GSE purchase announcement.
  2. Spreads had narrowed earlier due to very low rate volatility and expectations that GSEs were buying more MBS, yet rising implied and actual interest-rate volatility has pushed spreads wider again as markets reassess how sustainable the tight spreads are.
  3. January GSE holdings rose only modestly (Freddie ~$3.9B, Fannie ~$11.5B), but those monthly figures show settled purchases only and don’t reflect commitments that would mostly settle in February or later, so they don’t reveal the true pace of GSE buying.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 229 implied HN points • 06 Mar 26
  1. Existing home sales look to be flat or slightly down year‑over‑year, with early-reporting markets showing about a 2.9% drop and sales well below February 2019 levels.
  2. New listings and active inventory are rising — new listings were up roughly 5.5% year‑over‑year and active inventory climbed about 12%, so more supply is coming onto the market.
  3. Local conditions vary: Las Vegas is seeing slower sales, lower prices and rising inventory, while the Pacific Northwest has transactions down around 3% and listings up about 28% even as mortgage rates sit near 6.1%.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 191 implied HN points • 26 Feb 26
  1. Single-family serious delinquency rates for Freddie and Fannie ticked up slightly in January (Freddie 0.60%, Fannie 0.59%) but remain very low and at or below pre-pandemic levels.
  2. Fannie Mae’s multi-family delinquency rate declined in the latest report but is still near the elevated levels seen during the housing bust.
  3. Serious delinquencies are concentrated in older bubble-era vintages (2004 and earlier, 2005–2008), while loans originated from 2009–2025 show much lower delinquency rates; the report also counts loans in forbearance as delinquent even though they aren’t sent to credit bureaus.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 62 implied HN points • 03 Mar 26
  1. Delinquencies, foreclosures, and the dollar value of REO properties have risen year‑over‑year but remain low by historical standards.
  2. Solid mortgage underwriting, widespread homeowner equity, and mostly fixed low rates make a large wave of foreclosures and cascading price declines unlikely.
  3. Foreclosure starts and inventory increases warrant monitoring, but many borrowers can sell or restructure loans, so the overall situation looks manageable rather than crisis‑level.
In My Tribe • 850 implied HN points • 29 Nov 25
  1. Home ownership in the U.S. has faced many challenges over time. Policies have changed, but finding a solution everyone agrees on is still tough.
  2. During the Great Depression, many farmers couldn't pay back their mortgages, leading to important reforms like the introduction of 30-year amortized loans that helped stabilize home financing.
  3. Past regulatory changes meant to prevent financial crises often backfired, leading to more issues. Reducing reliance on debt and promoting savings for down payments could help make finance more stable.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 124 implied HN points • 04 Feb 26
  1. A housing economist shared updated data and commentary on upcoming GSE MBS purchases and recent movements in mortgage yields and spreads.
  2. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac released their December volume summary reports, the latest monthly data ahead of a key early-January policy milestone.
  3. The update gives an early read on how banks may respond to GSE actions and market shifts, which could influence mortgage spreads and market liquidity.
Spilled Coffee • 36 implied HN points • 04 Mar 26
  1. Interest rates are finally falling, but that hasn’t translated into lower home prices yet, so cheaper financing doesn’t automatically mean cheaper homes.
  2. Inventory is rising and there are more sellers than buyers, yet overall demand has barely moved, creating mixed signals about whether it’s truly a buyer’s market.
  3. Individual listings can still spark bidding wars and sell well above asking—especially for clean, desirable properties—so outcomes vary by property and buyers should be selective and cautious.
Erdmann Housing Tracker • 105 implied HN points • 06 Feb 26
  1. Fixed-rate mortgages give borrowers predictable payments by shifting inflation/speculation risk onto the loan, which raises interest rates and makes mortgages more expensive.
  2. The Fixed Amortization/Adjustable Principal (FA/AP) is a floating-rate loan where you pay a fixed scheduled payment and the lender adjusts the principal each year to reconcile the difference with the market rate.
  3. FA/AP produces lower and more dependable starting payments (about 20% lower in the example) with only small annual payment changes, and backtests show it keeps debt-to-income from rising materially over the loan term.
In My Tribe • 486 implied HN points • 18 Nov 25
  1. A 30-year mortgage has higher monthly payments but lets you pay off your principal faster compared to a 50-year mortgage, which has lower payments but keeps you in debt longer.
  2. Gimmicks like 50-year mortgages can seem appealing because of lower payments, but they slow down how quickly you build equity in your home.
  3. When deciding whether to pay off your mortgage early, consider how much you could earn by investing that money elsewhere versus the interest you're saving.
Erdmann Housing Tracker • 126 implied HN points • 27 Jan 26
  1. Changes in mortgage rates mainly shift short-term buying and prices, but they don't plausibly explain large, long-term declines in the share of first-time homebuyers.
  2. Factors like credit access rules, down-payment/LTV constraints, repeat-buyer activity, foreclosure and seller swings, and housing supply shortages are more important and lasting drivers of homeownership patterns.
  3. Empirical models that accumulate transitory rate shocks or use unrealistic assumptions (no construction, exogenous rents) can give misleading causal conclusions, so housing research needs better counterfactuals and out-of-sample testing.
Erdmann Housing Tracker • 105 implied HN points • 29 Jan 26
  1. Low mortgage rates and wider mortgage access historically did not drive overall inflation; when mortgage access tightened after 2007 homeownership fell and rent inflation sped up.
  2. The country is in a housing shortage, and adding multi-family or even high-end units reduces pressure on low-tier rents through filtering and sales chains, so building more supply (including luxury) helps the worst-off.
  3. Household sizes stopped shrinking decades ago and the recent rise in adults per household reflects people doubling up because of the housing crisis, so claims that homes are bigger and households smaller are outdated and misleading.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 43 implied HN points • 16 Feb 26
  1. Active listings for existing homes are up about 10% year‑over‑year and month‑of‑inventory is back to pre‑pandemic levels, which is putting downward pressure on prices and could lead to year‑over‑year price declines this year. Most homeowners still have substantial equity and low mortgage rates, so a big wave of distressed sales is unlikely.
  2. Homebuilders look to face a difficult 2026 because they have many completed homes for sale and an unusually large number of unsold homes under construction, so they’re cutting prices to compete with growing existing‑home inventory.
  3. Key government data on housing starts and new home sales are delayed by the shutdown, leaving the picture incomplete, and different sources show mixed inventory trends even though national supply remains roughly 17% below 2017–19 levels and the inventory recovery has stalled.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 86 implied HN points • 29 Jan 26
  1. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae saw slight increases in single-family serious delinquency rates in December (Freddie 0.58%→0.59%, Fannie 0.57%→0.58%), but both remain low and at or below pre-pandemic levels.
  2. Fannie’s delinquency issues are concentrated in older loan vintages — loans from 2004–2008 show much higher serious delinquency rates (about 1.4–2.0%) while 2009–2025 vintages are low (around 0.53%).
  3. Fannie Mae’s multi-family delinquency rate is approaching housing-bust highs, and the report counts loans in forbearance as delinquent even though those loans aren’t reported to credit bureaus.
Erdmann Housing Tracker • 210 implied HN points • 19 Dec 25
  1. A chronic housing supply shortage, not just short-term bubbles, is the main reason home prices and rents are high; cyclical swings now sit on top of a rising neutral price level.
  2. Measured home equity overstates real wealth because a large share of home prices is a rent premium created by scarcity, so Americans are poorer than headline net worth suggests.
  3. Policy choices and the post‑2008 lending shock reshaped who captured housing wealth and left many places and low‑income households worse off, causing geographic sorting where families pay high rents to stay put.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 28 implied HN points • 17 Feb 26
  1. Months-of-supply is back to pre-pandemic levels while 2025 home sales were the lowest since 1995 (tying 2024), which is putting downward pressure on prices, especially where inventory is high.
  2. Overall house prices were mostly unchanged year-over-year at the end of 2025 — the Case-Shiller National index was up about 1.4% YoY (Composite 10 +2.0%, Composite 20 +1.4%) — and recent month-to-month gains follow earlier declines, though Case-Shiller data lags by several months.
  3. Lower mortgage rates have led to a pickup in purchase mortgage applications recently, but that increase has not yet translated into significantly more closed sales.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 114 implied HN points • 05 Jan 26
  1. The housing bubble was visible as a sharp rise in mortgage debt relative to GDP, but current mortgage debt as a share of GDP does not show the same alarming pattern.
  2. Lending standards are much stronger now, and most recent mortgage originations come from borrowers with reasonably good credit.
  3. Most homeowners have significant equity and affordable, low-rate mortgages, so a large wave of distressed sales and cascading price declines is unlikely.
Erdmann Housing Tracker • 126 implied HN points • 02 Jan 26
  1. Rising home prices are mostly coming from rising rents, so higher price/rent ratios often reflect persistent rent inflation rather than just speculative price swings. Because officials treated the problem as a bubble and tightened demand after 2008, they made rent-driven scarcity worse.
  2. Most of the price growth is coming from land rents caused by a shortage of new urban housing, amplified by stricter mortgage access and local land-use restrictions. This scarcity has hit lower-tier neighborhoods hardest, raising housing costs for poorer families.
  3. Viewing expensive housing as mainly a luxury or positional good led to bad policy choices like restricting credit instead of addressing supply and access. Policy should focus on how mortgage access and supply constraints harm households forced to move, not just on high-end buyers or headline wealth numbers.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 28 implied HN points • 10 Feb 26
  1. Household debt rose in Q4 2025, driven by increases in mortgage balances and higher credit card balances.
  2. Delinquency rates edged up as more mortgages moved into 30–60 day late status and fewer loans cured back to current, while foreclosures increased slightly but remain below pre‑pandemic levels.
  3. Mortgage originations show strong credit quality (median score ~775) with almost no new loans to borrowers below 620, reflecting much tighter underwriting than during the housing bubble.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 28 implied HN points • 09 Feb 26
  1. Early-January rate declines toward 6% opened large refinance opportunities for millions and pushed affordability to a four-year high, but prices remain elevated relative to incomes.
  2. National home price growth slowed to its weakest pace since 2011, with the South and West weakening while the Northeast and Midwest hold firmer, and inventories still lagging pre-pandemic norms in many areas.
  3. Negative equity has risen to the highest level since 2018, concentrated in recent loan vintages and in several Southern markets where over 10% of mortgaged homes are underwater.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 28 implied HN points • 06 Feb 26
  1. Early-reporting markets show January existing-home sales down year-over-year (about 7.2% in those markets), and seasonally adjusted national sales are likely lower. Many areas hit by Winter Storm Fern haven’t reported yet, so delayed closings could make the final numbers weaker.
  2. New listings were up modestly (about 2.1% YoY) and active inventory rose roughly 11.4% YoY, so supply is increasing in these markets. However, listings are still down compared with January 2019 in many places.
  3. Mortgage rates averaged about 6.2% in November and December, and January closings mostly reflect contracts signed then, which likely weighed on sales. Overall, most of these local markets remain well below January 2019 sales levels.
Erdmann Housing Tracker • 63 implied HN points • 08 Jan 26
  1. A nationwide scarcity premium—people paying extra for limited location/lots rather than for actual housing—explains almost all of the elevated home prices and rents, especially in constrained metro areas. It will only fade as supply rises or closed-access cities reform, otherwise it could persist for decades.
  2. Tighter mortgage access since 2008 raised effective rents and shifted value away from ownership of structures toward land/scarcity, hitting lower-income neighborhoods hardest and increasing gross rental yields. This change also reduced who can buy and altered the kinds of homes that get built.
  3. A rapid correction of the scarcity premium requires a big building boom and a return toward earlier lending norms, which could cut the adjustment to 10–15 years; blocking construction or restricting investors will stretch the correction out over many decades.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 19 implied HN points • 12 Feb 26
  1. Mortgage delinquencies rose in the fourth quarter of 2025 to a 4.26% rate, up about 27 basis points from the prior quarter and roughly 28 basis points year‑over‑year, while foreclosure starts held at 0.20%.
  2. Delinquencies increased across conventional, FHA, and VA loans, with FHA showing the biggest deterioration — about 11.52% delinquent and a notable jump in 90+ day delinquencies and foreclosure inventory.
  3. The rise appears linked to the expiration of pandemic-era FHA relief and uneven labor market conditions, and newer loan cohorts (2022–23) are struggling more than 2020–21 vintages, though improving FHA originations and moderating rates could help ease stress.
Erdmann Housing Tracker • 42 implied HN points • 22 Jan 26
  1. The conversation examines how mortgage lending standards have influenced the housing market.
  2. Shane Phillips from UCLA’s Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies shares policy perspectives on lending and its effects.
  3. A full, one-hour interview is available online for anyone who wants a deeper look at these issues.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 71 implied HN points • 26 Dec 25
  1. Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac saw single-family serious delinquency rates rise to about 0.58% in November, a small month-over-month and year-over-year increase but still below pre-pandemic highs.
  2. Delinquency is concentrated in older loan vintages: Fannie’s 2004-and-earlier and 2005–2008 loans have much higher serious delinquency rates, while loans from 2009–2025 show very low delinquency.
  3. Fannie Mae’s multi-family delinquency rate has climbed to its highest level since the housing bust (excluding the pandemic), signaling rising stress in the multi-family sector.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 33 implied HN points • 21 Jan 26
  1. Inventory has risen sharply back toward pre‑pandemic levels while existing‑home sales fell to the lowest since 1995, and that combination is putting downward pressure on prices.
  2. National house‑price indexes show only small year‑over‑year gains (around 1–2%), and the trend is slowing with reported data lagging recent market moves.
  3. Lower mortgage rates have increased purchase mortgage applications but haven’t yet boosted sales significantly, and a large wave of distressed sales is unlikely because most homeowners have strong equity and low rates.
cryptoeconomy • 668 implied HN points • 22 Apr 23
  1. Credit crunch is hitting various sectors like car loans, housing, and business loans.
  2. Banks are cutting off car loans due to difficulty in getting buyers approved, affecting dealers.
  3. Mortgages are in a critical state with plunging applications, high debt ratios, and increasing defaults.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 33 implied HN points • 13 Jan 26
  1. The announcement that the GSEs would buy $200 billion of MBS sharply tightened MBS/Treasury spreads and pushed current-coupon MBS yields down, even producing a briefly negative option-adjusted spread.
  2. The $200 billion figure likely matches the GSEs' room under the Treasury agreement, so they will probably fund purchases by issuing debt and reallocating Treasury holdings and hedge with longer-dated instruments; because spreads are so tight, debt‑financed MBS could have low or negative risk‑adjusted returns, so investors should plan an exit strategy.
  3. Model estimates of the real neutral fed funds rate imply a nominal neutral range roughly in the low to mid 3% area depending on inflation expectations, so the Fed’s current 3.5%–3.75% target is around or slightly above neutral.
Erdmann Housing Tracker • 42 implied HN points • 31 Dec 25
  1. A guest discussed the 2026 housing market outlook on C-SPAN Washington Journal.
  2. The conversation covered basics about where the housing market is headed and the key factors that led us here.
  3. The roughly 45-minute segment included live caller questions and a link to watch the full discussion.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 28 implied HN points • 12 Jan 26
  1. December existing home sales look mostly unchanged year‑over‑year, and 2025 may end up as one of the weakest sales years since 1995.
  2. Inventory and listing trends are mixed: new listings were down about 4.5% year‑over‑year while active inventory was up roughly 9–10% YoY, with both measures still differing from 2019 levels.
  3. December closings mainly reflect contracts signed in October and November when mortgage rates averaged about 6.25%, and working‑day/seasonal adjustments can noticeably change the reported year‑over‑year results.
Erdmann Housing Tracker • 21 implied HN points • 21 Jan 26
  1. Metro-area analyses act as 'all else equal' forecasts, so they project outcomes assuming other factors don’t change while still needing to account for many variables.
  2. A near-zero 2025 home-price forecast (about 0.1%) matched the observed change in the Zillow Home Value Index, showing that small, precise forecasts can be accurate.
  3. The outlook for 2026 calls for roughly 3% home-price appreciation, even though expert forecasts for 2025 varied widely from about -2% to 10.8%.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 33 implied HN points • 30 Dec 25
  1. A big share of outstanding fixed-rate mortgages still carry very low pandemic-era rates: loans under 4% peaked at 65.1% (now 51.5%) and loans under 5% peaked at 85.6% (now 68.6%).
  2. Those low existing rates created a strong lock-in that kept many homeowners from selling because replacing their mortgage would sharply raise monthly payments, and that helped depress available home inventory.
  3. That lock-in is slowly eroding — the share of loans above 6% rose from 7.3% in Q2 2022 to 21.2% in Q3 2025, which should gradually increase mobility in the market.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 23 implied HN points • 14 Jan 26
  1. The NAR sharply revised up its November median existing-home prices—especially in the Northeast—so preliminary numbers understated recent price gains and further revisions are possible.
  2. Because the NAR released its report earlier than usual, local realtor/MLS data were limited and some sales and inventory figures (for example versus Realtor.com) look inconsistent or may reflect definitional changes.
  3. Most of the recent rise in 30‑year mortgage rates comes from a wider primary/secondary mortgage spread driven by higher GSE guarantee fees and increased servicing/origination and regulatory costs, while higher MBS yields account for only about 3 basis points of the roughly 57 bp increase.
CalculatedRisk Newsletter • 23 implied HN points • 07 Jan 26
  1. 2025 saw one of the weakest years for existing home sales since 1995 and could be the lowest year on record since then.
  2. Early December data show a small year‑over‑year rise in sales in early‑reporting markets, but new listings fell about 9.6% while active inventory climbed about 12.7%.
  3. Compared with December 2019, new listings and sales are much lower (new listings down about 28%) while inventory is much higher in most areas, and mortgage rates around 6.25% in Oct–Nov likely restrained buyer activity.